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COMMENTS
AN "EQUIVOCAL ESTOPPEL": THE STRANGE
CAREER OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN
KENTUCKY CONTRACT LAW
INTRODUCTION
Promissory estoppel' is an equitable doctrine of contract
law under which promises that induce detrimental reliance on
the part of a promisee are enforced despite a lack of traditional
consideration. The extent to which this doctrine has developed
in Kentucky is unclear. Promissory estoppel was first applied
as an exception to the traditional equitable estoppel doctrine.
2
I REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTACrs § 90 (1973) formulates the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce ac-
tion or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which
does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be
limited as justice requires.
(2) A charitable subscription or a marriage settlement is binding under
Subsection (1) without proof that the promise induced action or forbearance.
See J. CALAr~m AND J. PERmLO, CoNTRAcTs 202 n.2 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as
CALAMARI & PERILLO] and J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CoNTRAcrS § 92 (2d rev. ed. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as MURRAY] for a comparison of the formulations of promissory
estoppel in the First and Second RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcrs.
2 Lawrence v. Lawrence, 140 S.W.2d 36 (Ky. 1911). The Kentucky Court defined
equitable estoppel as:
[t]he principle by which a party who knows or should know the truth is
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from denying, or asserting
the contrary of, any material fact which, by his words or conduct, affirmative
or negative, intentionally or through culpable negligence, he has induced
another, who was excusably ignorant of the true facts and who had a right
to rely upon such words or conduct, to believe and act upon them thereby,
as a consequence reasonably to be anticipated, changing his position in such
a way that he would suffer injury if such denial or contrary assertion were
allowed.
Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Marcum, 193 S.W.2d 461, 463 (Ky. 1946) (citing 19 Abi.
JuR. Estoppel § 34).
The essential elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of mate-
rial facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the
facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subse-
quently-attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation that
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Later, the doctrine was applied as promissory estoppel in a
series of charitable subscription cases.3 After that brief appear-
ance, however, Kentucky courts stopped referring to promis-
sory estoppel; rather, when deciding detrimental reliance
cases, courts talked only in terms of equitable estoppel or gen-
eral notions of "fairness and equity."5 As the doctrine contin-
ued to evolve in other states, expanding into the field of bargain
transactions,' promissory estoppel remained in limbo in Ken-
tucky and was never expressly extended beyond the charitable
subscription cases.
In 1974 the Kentucky Court of Appeals7 decided Electric
and Water Plant Board v. Suburban Acres Development, Inc.,I
and applied equitable estoppel in a way strikingly similar to
promissory estoppel.9 The results in Suburban, traditionally,
such conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other
persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And,
broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the essential
elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the
truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good faith, upon the conduct
or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) action or inaction based
thereon of such a character as to change the position or status of the party
claiming the estoppel, to his injury, detriment, or prejudice.
Electric and Water Plant Bd. v. Suburban Acres Dev. Corp., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 489, 491
(Ky. 1974); Smith v. Howard, 407 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Ky. 1966). Cf. Henderson,
Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 376 n.182
(1969) (another definition of equitable estoppel).
3 Lake Bluff Orphanage v. Magill's Ex'rs., 204 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1947); Transyl-
vania Univ. v. Rees, 179 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1944); Floyd v. Christian Church Widows
and Orphans Home, 176 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1943).
' Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency v. Goodwin, 514 S.W.2d 190 (Ky.
1974); Electric and Water Plant Bd. v. Suburban Acres Dev. Corp., 513 S.W.2d 489
(Ky. 1974).
1 Meade Constr. Co. v. Mansfield Commercial Elec., Inc., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106
(Ky. 1979).
See notes 24-32 infra for a discussion of this development.
Prior to 1976, the Kentucky Court of Appeals was the highest appellate court in
Kentucky. By a constitutional amendment effective January 1, 1976, the Kentucky
Supreme Court was created as the highest state court, and the Kentucky Court of
Appeals became an intermediate court of appeals. Ky. CONST. §§ 109-111. References
to the Court of Appeals in cases decided prior to 1976 will be to the high court;
references to the court of appeals in cases following 1975 will be to the intermediate
court.
513 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1974).
See also Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency v. Goodwin, 514 S.W.2d 190
(Ky. 1974), decided a few months after Suburban, for another example of equitable
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could have been achieved only by using promissory estoppel."0
In the recent decision of Meade Construction Co. v. Mansfield
Commercial Electric, Inc.," however, the Court implied that
promissory estoppel has yet to be recognized in Kentucky. Not-
withstanding the implication of Meade, Suburban raises the
question of whether the doctrine in its expanded form 2 has
been adopted by the Kentucky courts in effect if not in name.
This comment will analyze the development of promissory es-
toppel in Kentucky and suggest that Kentucky courts have
formulated an "equivocal estoppel" doctrine that embodies a
merging of the two traditional doctrines of promissory and eq-
uitable estoppel.
I. HiSTORIcAL DEVELOPMENT OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
Historically,'3 promissory estoppel was merely an excep-
estoppel being applied in what has come to be the traditional promissory estoppel
context.
,0 Equitable and promissory estoppel, in theory, are quite different. Equitable
estoppel involves an affirmative misrepresentation of a past or present fact on which
another relies to his detriment. In addition, equitable estoppel is a "shield not a
sword;" it is available to the relying party only as a defense to a claim asserted by the
misrepresenting party. Comment, Estoppel: Status of Promissory Estoppel in
Oklahoma, 22 OKLA. L. Rav. 89 (1969). It is not a basis for a cause of action. Morgan
v. Maryland Casualty Co., 458 S.W.2d 789, 790-91 (Ky. 1970) (estoppel does not create
a new right of action); Haubert v. Navajo Ref. Co., 264 P. 151 (Okla. 1928). See
generally 28 Am. JR.2d Estoppel and Waiver §§ 28, 29, 48 (1966 & Supp. 1978).
Promissory estoppel, on the other hand, can be the basis of an action. It involves
a promise of a future act or fact, not a misrepresentation of a past or present fact.
Promissory estoppel can be either a sword or a shield. Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d
684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Tiffany, Inc. v. W.M.K. Transit Mix, Inc., 493 P.2d 1220 (Ariz.
1972); Graddon v. Knight, 292 P.2d 632 (Cal. 1956); Farmland Ser. Coop., Inc. v.
Klein, 244 N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1976); Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965);
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965); 28 Am. JuR.2d Estoppel
and Waiver § 29 (Supp. 1978); Comment, Estoppel: Status of Promissory Estoppel in
Oklahoma, 22 OiuA. L. REv. 89, 90 (1969).
1 579 S:W.2d 105 (Ky. 1979). The Court stated: "We need not decide whether the
doctrine of promissory estoppel applies in this state or whether, if so, it governs this
case." Id. at 106.
12 Since the doctrine of promissory estoppel was originally applied in charitable
subscription cases, any utilization of that doctrine beyond the confines of charitable
subscription cases is actually an application of promissory estoppel in its "expanded
form."
" See CAAAm & PERuLLO, supra note 1, at 210; MuRRAY, supra note 1, at 195-
206; Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents, 50 MIcH. L. REv. 639, 873
(1952); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98
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tion to traditional equitable estoppel doctrine;" as such, courts
used the exception to enforce certain agreements based on mis-
representations relating to the future. Conversely, equitable
estoppel usually only applied to misrepresentations of past or
present facts.'5 Courts applied this exception to five categories
of cases: (1) family promises,'" (2) gratuitous promises to con-
vey land followed by taking of possession and making of im-
provements,' 7 (3) gratuitous bailments and agencies,' 8 (4)
promises to surrender existing legal rights, 9 and (5) charitable
subscriptions. 0 This equitable estoppel exception was eventu-
ally christened promissory estoppel 2' and later accorded formal
recognition in section 90 of the Restatement (First) of
Contracts.22 Many courts eventually began to apply section 90
U. PA. L. REV. 459 (1950); Henderson, Promissory Estoppel and Traditional Contract
Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343, 343-50 (1969); See Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956), for a
general discussion of the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
" The doctrine of promissory estoppel emerged originally as an exten-
sion of the equitable concept of estoppel. The courts in applying the doctrine
would look first to conventional theories of consideration in order to enforce
the promise as a contract. If there was no evidence of a quid pro quo, the
courts would in extraordinary circumstances enforce the promise based on
the theory that there had been detrimental reliance and that to deny enforce-
ment would serve to facilitate an injustice.
Comment, Promissory Estoppel Marches On-Mooreburger, 28 BAYLOR L. Rv. 703,
704 (1976).
,1 See note 10 supra for a discussion of the proper application of equitable estop-
pel. See also Marker v. Preferred Fire Ins. Co., 506 P.2d 1163 (Kan. 1973); Loranger
Constr. Corp. v. E.P. Hauserman Co., 374 N.E.2d 306 (Mass. App. 1978); Clifton v.
Ogle, 526 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) ("difference of promissory estoppel from
ordinary equitable estoppel is that the representation is promissory rather than as to
an existing fact." Id. at 603).
28 E.g., Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
, E.g., Seavey v. Drake, 62 N.H. 393 (1882). Cf. Miller v. Lawlor, 66 N.W.2d 267
(Iowa 1954); see Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930).
11 E.g., Siegel v. Spear & Co., 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923). See Thorne v. Deas, 4
Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809), followed in Comfort v. McCorkle, 268 N.Y.S. 192 (Sup. Ct.
1933), rev'd by implication, Speigel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 160 N.E.2d 40 (N.Y.
1959).
29 E.g., Schroeder v. Young, 161 U.S. 334 (1896); May v. City of Kearney, 17
N.W.2d 448 (Neb. 1945).
22 E.g., Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 159 N.E. 173
(N.Y. 1927).
221 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 139 (1st ed. 1920); Boyer, Promissory Estoppel:
Requirements and Limitations of the Doctrine, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 459, 459 n.1 (1950).
2 Boyer, supra note 21, at 459.
1979-80]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
to the equitable estoppel exception categories.s
From the outset, promissory estoppel was used in conjunc-
tion with gratuitous promises. 2 If the promisee could show rea-
sonable detrimental reliance, the courts would enforce such
gratuitous promises despite the absence of traditional contract
consideration. In fact, some courts recognized promissory es-
toppel as a substitute for consideration in the gratuitous prom-
ise context.
25
Although courts became quite liberal in applying promis-
sory estoppel to gratuitous promises, they were reluctant to
expand the doctrine into the field of bargain transactions.20 In
time, however, the courts made this transition, and today the
usual setting from which promissory estoppel emerges is com-
mercial, not benevolent.-" Promissory estoppel has been used in
cases involving subcontractors' bids,28 franchises,20 and shop-
ping center construction financing." The progressive evolution
of promissory estoppel has lead one commentator to suggest
that promissory estoppel might replace consideraton as the
3 E.g., Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954) (charitable
subscriptions); Greiner v. Greiner, 293 P. 759 (Kan. 1930) (promise to make gift of
land); Lusk-Harbison-Jones, Inc. v. Universal Credit Co., 145 So. 623 (Miss. 1933)
(gratuitous bailment and agency); Jackson v. Kemp, 365 S.W.2d 437 (Tenn. 1963)
(promise not to plead statute of limitations in tort case).
24 "Gratuitous promise" traditionally meant the promise of a gift. Courts have
tended to extend that definition to include all promises unsupported by consideration.
Henderson, Promisory Estoppel and Traditional Contract Doctrine, 78 YALE L.J. 343,
344 n.3 (1969).
2 Southeastern Sales and Serv. Co. v. T. T. Watson, Inc., 172 So.2d 239, 240 (Fla.
1965); Friedman v. Tappan Dev. Corp., 126 A.2d 646, 652 (N.J. 1956).
28 James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros. Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933).
2 Henderson, supra note 24, at 344.
21 N. Litterio & Co. v. Glassman Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Robert
Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1941) (rejected James Baird
Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1933), but found insufficient detrimental
reliance for promissory estoppel); Reynolds v. Texarkana Constr. Co., 374 S.W.2d 818
(Ark. 1964); Drennan v. Star Paving Co., 333 P.2d 757 (Cal. 1958); Northwestern Eng'r
Co. v. Ellerman, 10 N.W.2d 879 (S.D. 1943).
2 Goodman v. Dicker, 169 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1948); Chrysler Corp. v. Quimby,
144 A.2d 123 (Del. 1958); Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965)
(involving promises made in preliminary negotiations).
30 Wheeler v. White, 398 S.W.2d 93 (Tex. 1965) (application of promissory estop-
pel where the contract would have failed for indefiniteness). See also Comment,
Promissory Estoppel Marches On--Mooreburger, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 703, 706-08 (1976)
for a discussion of Wheeler.
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main contract validation device3 1 and that the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts' formulation of the doctrine could give
added impetus to the utilization of promissory estoppel as the
basis of a cause of action that is not based on tort, contract, or
quasi-contract theories.
3 2
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IN KENTUCKY
A. The Equitable Estoppel Exception and Charitable
Subscription Cases
The early application of promissory estoppel in Kentucky
followed the historical pattern. In Lawrence v. Lawrence,s a
stepson who held a mortgage on property in which his step-
mother had a homestead interest initiated foreclosure proceed-
ings and induced his stepmother to acquiesce by telling her
that she could continue to remain on the property in the fu-
ture.3 The stepson foreclosed, bought the property for one dol-
lar more than the price that would have allowed a redemption,
and then conveyed the property to his son. In reversing the trial
court's decision in favor of the stepson, the Court held that,
considering the relationship of the parties, these facts were
sufficient to show estoppel or fraud, either of which would allow
relief.35 Since the Court in Lawrence applied estoppel to a situ-
ation involving the misrepresentation of a future act, that case
is an example of the application of the equitable estoppel ex-
ception involving a family promise and the surrender of an
existing legal right.3
, MURRAY, supra note 1, at 206.
s2 CALAmAm & PERELLO, supra note 1, at 218.
140 S.W. 36 (Ky. 1911).
3' Id. at 37-38.
The court said:
If he acted in good faith [inducing her not to resist foreclosure] not intend-
ing to mislead her, he is estopped to say that he should be allowed to take
the property and turn her out; and, if he acted in bad faith, the judgment
was obtained by fraud and cannot be permitted to stand. In either view of
the matter she is entitled to the relief sought.
Id. at 38.
11 The legal right surrendered was the right to oppose the foreclosure. See Urban
Renewal and Community Dev. Agency v. Goodwin, 514 S.W.2d 190 (Ky. 1974) for a
recent case in which the Court applied the equitable estoppel exception to a future
promise. In that case, the agency informed owners of condemned property that they
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Some years later, in a series of three cases involving chari-
table subscriptions, the Kentucky Court of Appeals expressly
approved promissory estoppel and section 90 of the
Restatement (First) of Contracts. The first case, Floyd v.
Christian Church Widows and Orphans Home,37 involved the
promise of a man and his wife to donate certain sums of money,
payable sixty days after their deaths, to several charities. The
Court examined the various theories that other jurisdictions
had applied to enforce such subscriptions and concluded that
the most logical was promissory estoppel and then cited sebtion
90 for its definition of the doctrine. In ruling that the subscrip-
tion was not enforceable by the charities because of the lack of
valuable consideration, the Court said "that an actual, rather
than an illusory consideration, or at least an estoppel of the
promisor to object, is necessary to render a charitable subscrip-
tion enforceable. ' 38 In Floyd, since there was no return promise
by the charities for the subscription and no proven detrimental
reliance by the charities, neither valuable consideration nor the
proper circumstances for promissory estoppel existed to render
the pledges enforceable.
39
The following year, under similar facts, the Court enforced
a pledge in Transylvania University v. Rees" because the char-
ity, in return for the pledge, promised to pay the widow of the
pledgee six per cent interest on the pledged amount after his
death." The Court again did not rely on promissory estoppel,
but explained that such estoppel was not used in Floyd because
the charities had not shown an affirmative reliance on the
could retain it if they made certain improvements. The owners, relying on the represen-
tation, made substantial improvements and abandoned an appeal of the condemnation
judgment. The Court said estoppel was appropriate when the agency tried to take the
property despite the improvements.
37 176 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1943). See Note, Validity of Charitable Subscriptions in
Kentucky, 33 Ky. L.J. 50, 50-51 (1944) for a discussion of the case.
n 176 S.W.2d at 131. The Court was willing to view promissory estoppel as a
substitute for consideration in charitable subscription cases.
11 Before applying promissory estoppel, courts usually look for the existence of
conventional consideration. If it is not present, they determine if the elements for a
promissory estoppel exist. CALAMAI & PERMLO, supra note 1, at 210. See also Annot.,
48 A.L.R.2d 1069 (1956) for a discussion of how promissory estoppel can limit the
enforcement of charitable subscriptions.
40 179 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1944).
" Id. at 892.
[Vol. 68
PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
pledge.". Finally, in Lake Bluff Orphanage v. Magill's
Executors,4" the Court, citing Floyd and section 90, found suffi-
cient detrimental reliance by the orphanage to render a pledge
enforceable through promissory estoppel."
Thus, by 1947 Kentucky had followed the historical pat-
tern of the developing doctrine of promissory estoppel from its
rudiments in the equitable estoppel exception to full recogni-
tion in section 90 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts.
B. Suburban and Promissory Estoppel
A gap of more than thirty years separated the equitable
estoppel exception applied in Lawrence and the formal recogni-
tion of promissory estoppel in the charitable subscription
cases; another thirty years passed before the next step in the
doctrine's development occurred. In that third evolutionary
step, courts again applied the concept of promissory estoppel
under the title of equitable estoppel, as if to bring the develop-
ment of the doctrine full circle back to its origin. 5
In Electric and Water Plant Board v. Suburban Acres De-
velopment, Inc.," a development company acquired a tract of
land on which to build an apartment complex outside the city
of Frankfort. In order to secure the necessary financing for the
construction, the company contacted the Water Plant Board
and requested that the Board send it a letter stating that utility
service would be available to the complex. The Board was in-
formed of the reason for the letter. The following letter was sent
to Suburban:
Pursuant to your request, be advised that an adequate sup-
ply of water and electricity can readily be made available to
the plot of land indicated ....
Until we are fully informed as to the details of the con-
templated development, we would not be in a position to
indicate to you the cost that would be involved.
42 Id.
11 204 S.W.2d 224 (Ky. 1947).
1 Relief was still denied, even though the pledge was enforceable, because no fund
existed from which to pay the award. Id. at 228.
41 Urban Renewal and Community Dev. Agency v. Goodwin, 514 S.W.2d 190 (Ky.
1974), discussed in note 36 supra, seems to reaffirm the Kentucky Court's view of the
doctrine as an equitable estoppel exception even today.
,1 513 S.W.2d 489 (Ky. 1974).
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The matter of the Electric and Water Plant Board of the
City of Frankfort supplying your electrical needs is being
questioned by Kentucky Utilities Company. However, at this
time we are unwilling to admit that we do not have the right
to serve your property. 7
Suburban used the letter to obtain a construction loan and
began building. Six weeks later, after Suburban had requested
water service, the Board voted to delay providing water until
the issue of the electric service had been settled. Suburban
then filed suit, requesting an injunction ordering the Board to
furnish water. The trial court granted the injunction, holding
that the Board was estopped to deny such service, and, in
addition, ordered the Board to enter into a contract with the
development company on terms compatible with the court's
decision. On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed
and held that the situation presented facts constituting estop-
pel. The Court explained that "[t]he Electric & Water Plant
Board was informed that a letter of commitment for service was
necessary to arrange for financing; the letter was furnished.
Suburban in reliance on the letter made financial commit-
ments and commenced construction."" The Court then quoted
a definition of equitable estoppel, cited Smith v. Howard,49 and
'7 513 S.W.2d at 490.
"Id. at 491.
49 407 S.W.2d 139 (Ky. 1966). See note 2 supra for the essential elements of
equitable estoppel.
Smith involved zoning restrictions. In that case, a property owner wrote a letter
to the local Zoning Commission, stating that, if he received permission to lease his
building for one year as a non-conforming use, he would not use that permission as an
excuse for seeking permanent rezoning of his building. The Commission granted per-
mission for the one year lease.
Some years later the Commission attempted to deny this non-conforming use,
contending that the owner should be estopped to claim permission because of his
representations in the letter. The Court disagreed and held that "the representations
contained in this letter being without consideration did not amount to an estoppel."
Id. at 143. Furthermore, there was no detrimental reliance. The Commission "took no
action as a result of the letter, which was of 'such character as to change its position
prejudicially'." Id. Because the proper owner sought permission to continue his use by
a gratuitous assertion that he would not ask for an extension, in doing so, he was not
estopped.
The representation in Smith was really a promise. Because the promise concerned
a future act and not a past or present fact, the estoppel the Court considered was
promissory rather than equitable. In other words, the Court in Smith rejected a claim
[Vol. 68
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concluded that the facts fell within the definition.
Even though promissory and equitable estoppel are often
hard to distinguish, 0 the distinction was clear in Suburban.
The letter, which the Board knew was for financing, contained
an implicit promise to furnish water to Suburban.5 To argue
that the letter was merely a representation of a present fact,
that the Board could at that time supply Suburban with water,
is, at best, an argument of form over substance." The tenor of
the whole arrangement was for the future. Both Suburban and
the bank wanted commitments for the future; this common
desire was the essence of the arrangement. The remedy, there-
fore, was in the proper province of promissory, not equitable,
estoppel. Furthermore, the estoppel in Suburban was the basis
for a cause of action and not a defense to a suit by the Board.
The Court forced the Board to furnish water and to enter into
a contract upon terms the Court found dictated by the estop-
pel. By comparing the application of the two estoppels with the
facts of Suburban,53 it is clear that the doctrine the Court ap-
plied and called equitable estoppel was, in fact, promissory
estoppel.
On the surface, the decision in Suburban indicated that,
analytically speaking, the Court had indeed come full circle in
its handling of detrimental reliance cases. Although it seemed
that the Court had moved from applying an equitable estoppel
exception to an application of promissory estoppel and then
back to the use of the equitable estoppel exception, the Court
had actually just broadened the doctrine of equitable estoppel
of promissory estoppel by the Commission, not equitable estoppel, because of a lack
of consideration and detrimental reliance. The Court in Suburban applied essentially
the same definition of equitable estoppel and cited Smith, but achieved the opposite
result because there was detrimental reliance. This fact suggests either a tacit recogni-
tion of promissory estoppel or a careless application of the doctrine of equitable estop-
pel.
. See note 10 supra for an analysis of the theoretical differences between promis-
sory and equitable stoppel. See also Henderson, supra note 13, at 376-80.
1 Mazer v. Jackson Ins. Agency, 340 So.2d 770 (Ala. 1976) (express promise un-
necessary to establish promissory estoppel).
52 See Seavey, Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARv. L.
RPv. 913, 922-23 (1950) ("every statement of the future includes some statement of
present facts." Id.).




to include all cases of detrimental reliance. As a result, no
distinction had to be drawn between promissory and equitable
estoppel because both now would be classified as types of equi-
table estoppel.
C. Meade and the "Equivocal Estoppel" Doctrine in
Kentucky
Based on Suburban, it is possible to conclude that Ken-
tucky's equitable estoppel doctrine represents a tacit adoption
of promissory estoppel, in effect if not in name. In this light,
equitable estoppel might more aptly be labeled "equivocal es-
toppel" since the acknowledged. availability of promissory es-
toppel in Kentucky is ambiguous, but the benefits of the doc-
trine are attainable. Under "equivocal estoppel" a court can
apply either traditional equitable estoppel or promissory estop-
pel.
This concept of an "equivocal estoppel" is illustrated in a
recent case, Meade Construction Company, Inc. v. Mansfield
Commercial Electric, Inc. " In Meade, a general contractor
sued a subcontractor for failure to perform a subcontract.
Mansfield Electric had submitted an electrical subcontractor's
bid for the electrical work in the construction of a stadium
press box to Meade Construction. Meade Construction used
that bid in computing its bid for the total project. Before the
project had been awarded, but after Meade Construction had
irrevocably submitted its project bid, Mansfield Electric re-
voked its bid on the press box;55 Meade Construction was forced
to substitute the second lowest bidder, thus causing an increase
in the cost of the project of approximately $8,000.
Based on these facts, Meade Construction brought an ac-
tion for damages against Mansfield Electric on the theory of
promissory estoppel, arguing that Mansfield had made an im-
plied promise not to withdraw its bid. Mansfield Electric
argued, as an affirmative defense, that Meade Construction
had never accepted its offer and that, since it had been re-
5, 579 S.W.2d 105 (Ky. 1979).
55 Usually a subcontractor withdraws its bid because of a major error in computa-
tion or cost calculation. In Meade, however, Mansfield withdrew because it had not
been paid for previous subcontract work done for Meade. Id. at 106.
[Vol. 68
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yoked, there had never been a binding contract. 6
The trial court found that the parties had not entered into
a binding contract and dismissed the case; the court of appeals
affirmed. In reversing the court of appeals decision, the Su-
preme Court ruled that "under any conception of fairness and
equity one who submits a quotation for the purpose of its being
used in the computation of a bid for a contract should be
bound, when the contract is awarded pursuant to a bid pre-
pared in reasonably forseeable reliance on that quotation, to
accept an agreement in conformity with the quotation."57 The
Court expressly reserved the question of whether promissory
estoppel applied in Kentucky or in the particular case at hand.
Yet, after quoting a definition of that doctrine from the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 90, the Court found
that Mansfield should "reasonably have expected that quota-
tion to be used in the preparation of the contract bid""8 and
that "Meade did rely upon Mansfield's offer."59 This analysis
is the same that would have been used and the result is the
same that would have been achieved by an application of the
doctrine of promissory estoppel. The conception of fairness and
equity used to decide the case was Kentucky's "equivocal es-
toppel."
CONCLUSION
Whether the embodiment of both equitable and promis-
sory estoppel in one general concept of "equivocal estoppel"
was by accident or design, such a combination is portrayed in
Kentucky case law. Since the policies behind both doctrines
11 CA-1354-MR (Ky. Ct. App. March 10, 1978).
An offer unsupported by considerotion is usually revocable, and, as a general
proposition, promissory estoppel will not make an offer irrevocable. Ordinarily, an
offeree is not justified in relying on an offer. To rely, the offeree need only accept. But
a bid by a subcontractor to a general contractor is somewhat different. It is predictable
that the general contractor will rely on the low bids received by him in computing his
bid for the overall project. The majority of courts which have considered the problem
of subcontractor bids have held that justifiable detrimental reliance on an offer will
render it irrevocable. CALAiu & PEmsLo, supra note 1, at 212. See generally MURRAY,
supra note 1, at § 93; Comment, Promissory Estoppel and Louisiana, 31 LA. L. REv.
84, 94-100 (1970).
579 S.W.2d at 106.
Id.
' Id. at 107.
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are the same, and since the distinction between the two is
largely historical, there is no reason why equitable and promis-
sory estoppel should not be merged into one doctrine. Theoreti-
cally, the only impact of the combination would be that equita-
ble estoppel would now have an affirmative aspect; equitable
estoppel would be available as a cause of action and not solely
as a defense." Both doctrines are based on detrimental reli-
ance, and a general doctrine embodying both makes sense.
The only danger existing in Kentucky's approach to the
estoppel issue is the confusion that an unenunciated doctrine
can create." The court of appeals decision in Meade illustrates
this potential problem. In that case, two judges, 2 viewing
promissory estoppel as unavailable in Kentucky, based their
decision on a lack of traditional consideration; only one judge 3
would have applied promissory estoppel if he had found suffi-
cient detrimental reliance. Such confusion about the availabil-
ity of promissory estoppel is not resolved by the "equivocal
estoppel" doctrine described above.
The status of promissory estoppel in Kentucky is still un-
clear. Outside the charitable subscription area, the doctrine
has not been officially embraced, but judicial decisions have
largely made that technicality moot. Kentucky courts have, in
effect, created an equivocal doctrine of equitable estoppel that,
by focusing on reasonable detrimental reliance, can operate as
either traditional equitable or promissory estoppel.
Steven Connelly
:0 See generally Henderson, supra note 13, at 376-80.
1 Consider an analogous situation described in Henderson, supra note 13, at 352-
53.
62 CA-1354-MR (Ky. Ct. App. March 10, 1978) (Howard & Reynolds, J J.).
3 Id. at 3 (Wilhoit, J., concurring).
[Vol. 68
